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Abstract: Venture Capital (VC) plays an important role in the 
commercialisation of innovation. Sectors like information and communication 
technologies and biotech account for two-thirds of all VC investments. Little 
attention has been paid to understanding how the venture capital market 
extends to new industries. Based on a survey of European energy technology 
VCs, we discuss the factors determining the emergence of a new market sector 
for VC investments. While there are sizeable investment opportunities, only  
2–5% of all venture capital is invested in energy.  
Three factors can help explain differences between energy and other more 
popular VC sectors: 
•  the perceived risk (market adoption risk, exit risk, technology risk, people 
risk, and regulatory risk) of investments in energy technologies 
•  the perceived returns in energy VC investments 
•  in an evolutionary perspective, the maturity of energy as a VC investment 
sector. 
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research focuses on the role of innovation for sustainable development, i.e., 
creating economic, environmental, and social value. Within the venture capital 
angle of this research, he investigates the role of financial and nonfinancial 
contributions by VCs to entrepreneurial firms commercialising new energy 
technologies. Another focus is on corporate venture capital as a means to 
introduce innovation in large incumbent firms of the energy sector. Prior to his 
current academic position, he worked for one of the leading European energy 
venture capital funds. 
Tarja Teppo is PhD candidate at Helsinki University of Technology (HUT) and 
a Project Leader at HUT’s Environmental Management Group. Previously, she 
held various positions within Nokia Corporation in Finland and the USA, most 
recently managing an internal venture at Nokia Ventures Organization. Her 
main research interests are sustainable entrepreneurship, venture capital, and 
corporate venturing. 
 
“The myth is that venture capitalists invest in good people and good ideas. The 
reality is that they invest in good industries.” (Zider, 1998) 
“Energy is essential to economic and social development and improved quality 
of life. Much of the world’s energy, however, is currently produced and 
consumed in ways that could not be sustained if technology were to remain 
constant and if overall quantities were to increase substantially.” (UN, 1992) 
1 Introduction 
1.1  Venture Capital (VC) 
Venture Capital (VC) can be defined as investment of long-term, risk equity finance by 
professional investors in new firms where the primary reward is eventual capital gain 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998). Venture capitalists do not only provide financial capital, but 
also take an active role in firm decision making. This is due to the specific situation of 
new ventures, which are characterised by high levels of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. Therefore, VCs are typically highly 
specialised in identifying, investing in and monitoring new firms in a specific sector 
and/or on a specific stage of development of a company. As Wright and Robbie (1998) 
note, “venture capital is particularly appropriate in a specific subset of firms which have 
non-redeployable or highly specialised assets”. Early-stage high technology companies in 
the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) or biotechnology sectors are 
typical examples, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all VC investments (BVK, 2003). 
VC research has shown that VC-backed firms play an important role in commercialising 
breakthrough technologies, and has investigated the drivers for value creation in the   
VC-entrepreneur relationship (Barry et al., 1990; Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Historically, 
empirical research on venture capital has focussed on ICT and biotech, since these   
two sectors have the best data availability. Very little work has been done to understand 
how new sectors for VC investment emerge, which is necessary to understand the 
development of the sustainable energy VC market.  
VC research also provides insights into the venture capital cycle (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999). VC is provided to different stages of company development. While seed 
funding is typically provided by business angels, venture capitalists provide early- and     
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expansion stage financing. Venture capitalists will typically look at exiting their 
investment two to eight years after investing, typically through Initial Public Offerings 
(IPO) or trade sales. Between expansion stage and IPO, there may be additional financing 
rounds by Private Equity funds.
1 For a healthy venture capital market, it is essential  
that there is sufficient capital and know-how on all stages of the VC cycle, as well as  
exit opportunities.  
1.2  The investment opportunity in sustainable energy technologies 
The energy sector is one of the largest sectors of the economy, accounting for annual 
sales of about $2,000 billion worldwide (SAM, 2002). The total investment requirement 
for energy-supply infrastructure worldwide over the period 2001–2030 is estimated at 
$16 trillion by the International Energy Agency, which is a substantial increase, in real 
terms, compared to the prior 30-year period (IEA, 2003). A set of environmental and 
security concerns, in conjunction with technological innovation, is currently leading to 
fundamental changes in the energy industry. More than 80% of the electricity worldwide 
is generated based on either fossil fuels, which are one of the main reasons for global 
warming, or nuclear energy, which involves security concerns and hazardous waste 
issues.
2 Looking at all energy (including fuels for transportation and heating), the 
combined share of oil, coal and gas is 86% of global energy consumption, with nuclear 
energy adding another 6.5% in 2001.
3 Oil reserves are increasingly concentrated in a few 
countries of the Middle East, and new strong demand comes from emerging countries 
like China. Also, more than two-thirds of the primary energy gets lost due to 
inefficiencies in the energy sector and on the demand side (UNDP/WEC/UNDESA, 
2000). Sustainable energy technologies,
4 such as wind turbines, solar cells, small-scale 
combined heat and power generation (micro-CHP), or energy efficiency software, can 
help address the undesirable side effects of energy use. Several governments have started 
to design policy mechanisms intended to support market introduction of these 
technologies. At the same time, increasing numbers of both private and corporate energy 
users are buying green power (Bird et al., 2002). 
One particularity of sustainable energy technologies and services is that they create 
both private and societal benefits. In terms of their private value, they compete directly 
with conventional energy sources – a wind turbine provides technically more or less the 
same quality of electricity as a coal-fired power plant. The societal value – avoiding 
emissions and reducing import dependence – is what makes them attractive for 
governments. Venture capitalists, unlike governments, look for investments that create 
private rather than societal value. Looking strictly at private value, the equation often 
looks unfavourable for sustainable energy technologies today, since they are early on the 
learning curve and hence they have higher cost. This is only partly offset by side benefits, 
such as modular scale, lower maintenance, hedging against fuel price fluctuations. So 
while investment needs are huge in this sector, it is not trivial whether there will be the 
right incentives to mobilise enough private capital (IEA, 2003). This may be an issue for 
the venture capital segment of the financial market, too, even though new energy 
technologies have recently made it to the headlines of the venture capital community.
5     
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1.3  Status of VC investment in sustainable energy 
Reliable data about European VC investments in sustainable energy is hard to find, since 
(a) data on venture capital investment is generally not publicly available, and (b) as 
energy is an emerging VC category, energy deals are often not properly identified in  
the statistics.
6 According to the German Venture Capital Association (BVK, 2003) 
energy and environmental technologies each accounted for about nine million Euro or 
1.3% of early-stage VC investments in 2002, while biotechnology, and software and 
communications technologies added up to 63.6% of all VC investments (see Figure 1). 
As for global figures, data compiled by Nth Power, a leading energy VC fund based in 
San Francisco, shows that sustainable energy accounted for $526 million or about 2% of 
overall VC investments in 2003. Notably, this share has been continuously rising since 
2000, with a particular significant increase in Europe.  
Figure 1  Sectoral distribution of early-stage VC investments in Germany 2002 
Source: BVK  (2003) 
Looking at the striking differences in investment between energy technology and VC 
sectors like biotech and IT leads us to the following two research questions: 
1  Which factors determine the attractiveness of sustainable energy as a target for 
venture capital investments relative to other sectors (like ICT and biotech)?  
2  Which drivers and barriers do venture capitalists perceive as influencing future 
growth of the sustainable energy VC market? 
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1.4 Methodology 
There has been very little industry-specific academic research on venture capital 
investments in the energy sector to date. Also, the number of funds active in this area and 
VC-backed energy ventures is still fairly small and their operating history limited to only 
a few years in most European cases. Therefore, we have chosen a mainly qualitative 
approach for our research. The core of our data is taken from 23 semi-structured, 
qualitative, face-to-face interviews with venture capitalists that were performed between 
August 2003 and March 2004. Interviews usually lasted about 1.5 hours, and were led at 
the VC fund’s premises. Our interviewees were either partners/principals of the VC fund 
or Senior Investment Managers. We interviewed VCs in nine countries, mainly in 
Europe, and two interviews in North America. Eleven of these 23 interviews were with 
independent VCs, 11 with corporate VCs, and one with a government VC. All but one of 
the VCs in our sample had active investment experience in the energy sector, so we 
probably had a certain ‘believer bias’, but also a particularly knowledgeable sample. 
To validate our interview data, we also performed a written survey among attendants 
of the 2nd European Energy Venture Fair in Rüschlikon/Zurich (Switzerland) in October 
2003, which is the key industry event for energy venture capitalists in Europe.
7  
The questionnaire asked for barriers to expansion of energy VC, fostering factors for 
energy VC, exit routes, as well as personal/fund data. The three-page questionnaire was 
handed out to all 114 participants of the event, of which 64 were venture capitalists, 
representing 41 different VC firms. We received 26 responses, of which 23 were from 
venture capitalists (a-36% response rate for this group), representing 17 different VC 
firms (41% coverage) from 11 different countries, of which nine European. While the 
sample is small in total numbers, it provides a very good coverage of the energy VC 
pioneers in Europe. The quality of the sample is underlined by the experience of the 
responding VCs. VC professionals in our sample had an average energy industry 
experience of 8.4 years (ranging from 0 to 42 years), and an average VC industry 
experience of 4.6 years (between 0 and 15 years). On average, the VC funds that they 
represented had made 9.8 investments, of which 4.4 in energy. Fifty-six percent of the 
VCs in our sample represented an independent venture capital fund, 35% came from 
corporate venture capital funds, the rest being other investors or consultants.  
2  A ‘good industry’ for venture capitalists – a matter of risk and return 
Rather than using an existing theory, we performed our interviews with the objective to 
contribute to theory building in this uncharted territory. In presenting the results of our 
analysis, we structured them based on the fundamentals of any investment: risk and 
return. We suggest that VCs, as any investors, will avoid investments where risk is 
perceived as being too high or returns are expected to be too low to compensate for the 
risks encountered. This is in line with much of the previous work on VC decision 
making.
8 Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) analysed the factors that VCs use in assessing a deal. 
Starting from 23 characteristics, they reduced those to five underlying dimensions 
(Market Attractiveness, Product Differentiation, Managerial Capabilities, Environmental 
Threat Resistance, Cash-Out Potential), which they in turn summarised as describing 
expected return and perceived risk. Moreover, as Ruhnka and Young (1991) hypothesise,     
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VCs with special skills and expertise are able to alter both sides of the return-to-risk ratio 
for the ventures that they invest in. They can manage risk by possessing particular 
knowledge about a specific industry, which gives them a competitive advantage over 
other investors. And they can manage return by leveraging their industry-specific 
network to increase the probability of a successful exit. Both a VC’s expertise and 
network are typically sector-specific, which explains the existence of VC funds that 
specialise in certain industries. We therefore explore the risk characteristics of energy 
technology VC investments in this section, and subsequently discuss factors that 
influence their returns (Section 3).  
There are many different approaches to defining risk. In the finance literature, risk is 
usually defined as deviation from an expected result, both upwards and downwards. On 
the other hand, a popular conception of risk is rather associated with negative deviations, 
i.e., losses (March and Shapira, 1987). Another distinction is between financial risk and 
operational (nonfinancial) risk. Operational risk has been defined by Hoffmann (2002) in 
five categories, namely people risk, relationship risk, technology risk, physical risk, and 
risk that results from external factors (including regulatory risk).  
For venture capital investing specifically, Ruhnka and Young (1991) have compiled a 
list of 37 different risks that occur on different stages of VC investing. Categorising these 
risks as either internal or external to the venture, they argue that internal risks dominate 
for early-stage ventures, while external risks, i.e., those that can be managed by the 
entrepreneur or the VC only to a limited extent, increase in relative importance over time 
as the company matures. Baum and Silverman (2004) choose a different term, when they 
talk about three types of capital that determine the VC’s decision to finance start-up firms 
in the biotechnology and their impact on future startup performance: Alliance capital, 
intellectual capital (i.e., patents) and human capital. This can be easily translated into 
risks, where for example uncertainty about the quality of human capital can be referred to 
as people risk.  
For reasons of practicability, we summarise the risks identified by Ruhnka   
and Young, and others into five categories: market adoption risk, technology risk,   
people risk, regulatory risk, and exit risk. For each of these risks, we will answer the 
following questions: 
•  Where does this risk come from? 
•  Why is this risk relevant in a VC investment context? 
•  How does this risk affect VC investments in energy technology differently than in 
other sectors? 
•  How can this risk be managed? 
In answering the first two questions, we will mostly draw on VC literature, while the 
third and fourth questions will mainly be addressed based on data from our interviews.  
2.1  Market adoption risk 
Demand for a new product is usually unknown in advance. The adoption of a new 
product, service or technology ultimately depends on the customers, and can be 
influenced by the venture only to some limited extent. An additional source of market 
adoption risk appears in B2B markets with high levels of market concentration, where a 
small number of potential buyers decide about the adoption of a new technology and act     
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as gatekeepers for the venture to reach the final customer. Zider (1998) points out that, in 
contrast to a common perception, VCs are not particular risk-seekers, but are rather 
focusing on ‘the middle part of the classic industry S-curve’, that is the segment in the 
process of diffusion of innovation where growth rates have already taken off but not yet 
reached saturation. One way of managing market adoption risk is to avoid early-stage 
investments, where by definition there is the highest uncertainty about market needs. This 
can be transferred from individual investments to sectors: in sectors with a certain history 
of VC investing, such as IT or biotech today, there is less uncertainty about market needs 
for new technologies than, for example, in distributed energy systems, where it is still 
unclear who will be promising customer segments and what is the best way of addressing 
them. Successful market penetration of these technologies, such as fuel cells and other 
technologies for small-scale combined heat and power generation (micro-CHP), depends 
on things like that customers must be allowed to connect them to the grid, that 
interconnection standards exist and that customers are able to sell excess electricity to the 
grid operator at attractive prices: 
“A lot of business plans [in the fuel cell sector] rely on other external factors 
that you cannot control, and a VC is getting very nervous when you see big 
investment in a capital intensive and regulated market relying on a fundamental 
change in the environment.” 
On top of these uncertainties with regard to the end user of distributed energy 
technologies, electric utilities play an important role in market adoption risk since they 
act as gatekeepers: “One thing certainly that constrains [VC investment in] electricity is 
that your adoption of a technology still is in the hand largely of utilities”. 
In the case of sustainable energy technologies, an additional element of market 
adoption risk is that much of the Unique Selling Proposition (USP) lies in their societal 
value added, not in the private benefit that they generate for the end user. A mobile phone 
is likely to be preferred by customers over fixed line telephony because it provides him 
with completely new (private) benefits. Whether a solar cell will be bought by a 
residential customer to displace the fixed line electricity in his house is less obvious, 
since he cannot tell the difference in the final product that comes out of the wall socket. 
Uncertain advantages from the consumer’s point of view have also been identified as one 
important barrier to sustainable energy investments by European VCs in Kasemir et al. 
(2000). Rather than seeing this as a higher risk for sustainable energy technologies, one 
can also look at it as simply being a different risk profile. Positive externalities (such as 
CO2 emission reductions) associated with these technologies are unique compared to 
many other sectors that VCs invest in. The challenge lies in getting someone to pay for it, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the section on regulatory risk below.  
2.2 Technology  risk 
VC investments are risky because it is often unknown in advance whether or not a new 
technology will ultimately work. As Zider (1998) points out, “betting on a technology 
risk in an unproven market segment is something VCs avoid”. He acknowledges, 
however, that there are exceptions to this rule in the case of ‘concept stocks’, such as 
genetic engineering, where technology risk is very high, but potential returns are, too. 
Technology risk can be managed to some extent by VCs requiring a working prototype 
before they invest, and by staging investments, so that later financing rounds are tied to     
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the achievement of certain milestones in technology development. Technology risk is 
particularly important when it comes to technologies that are capital intensive to develop 
and have long lead times. Capital intensity of energy technologies (as opposed to, for 
example, internet companies) is one of the main barriers mentioned by several VCs: 
“[If you develop for example a microturbine with] $200 million of capital need 
to go in there, there are very few and almost no deals unless you are in a bold 
market like in 1999/2000 where you can raise that much money. [...] So in a 
bold market it works but as soon as the market becomes more normal [...] like 
now, it’s very difficult to find any investors for capital intensive cases   
like [Capstone].” 
One VC in our sample, who is not currently investing in sustainable energy, even   
saw capital intensity as prohibitive for venture capital investment in the energy sector, 
and felt like new energy technologies should be financed by other means, such as 
government funding.  
While the challenge of capital intensity is acknowledged by the ‘believers’ in energy 
among the VC community, too, they see it as something that needs to be managed rather 
than an insurmountable barrier. One way of managing capital intensity is to develop 
adequate business models that allow for maximum impact with limited capital input. 
Strategies to cope with capital intensity include: 
•  licensing/manufacturing partnerships 
•  franchising/distribution partnerships 
•  early exit 
•  pursuing multiple target markets (real options). 
Implementation of such capital-extensive business models is only beginning to emerge in 
the energy sector. An example of strategy (a) is Energetech,
9 a VC-backed Australian 
wave energy technology venture, which initially intended to go into construction of wave 
energy plants, but realised that putting their equity money into building concrete walls 
was too expensive. The company then changed their business model and now focus on 
the ‘intelligent core’ of their devices, while contracting the less IP-intensive parts out. 
Strategy (b) has been adopted by Capstone Turbine,
10 who initially tried to sell their 
product directly to every individual commercial customer, but soon had to realise that 
going through established distributors is more efficient. Strategy (c) is common practice 
in the biotechnology sector, which is equally capital intensive: “[In] biotech [...] 
developing, getting a drug from discovery to market is a seven-year process. Although 
once you get that you have a monopoly in the market [...] for another seven years or so”.  
In biotech, however, there is an established ‘early’ exit route for ventures. Biotech 
VCs manage capital intensity by taking investments only to a certain stage, such as FDA 
approval for their product, and then exiting through trade sale or IPO. An example of 
strategy (d) is Enginion,
11 a German manufacturer of steam cells. The company’s primary 
target market is micro-CHP, i.e., developing units for combined heat and power 
generation in residential or small commercial buildings. This is a large market, but has a 
number of entry barriers attached to it. Therefore, the company pursues another near-term 
market opportunity in parallel, which are Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) for cars and 
trucks. This provides enginion with two options to capitalise on their heavy R&D 
investment, rather than just betting on one horse.     
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Finally, capital intensity can actually also be regarded as an advantage rather than a 
disadvantage, namely for later-stage investors who are looking for larger financing 
rounds and are not set up to cope with early-stage deals, where they have to put in 
relatively high management effort to apply relatively small amounts of capital. Apart 
from some larger VC firms, this might be the rationale behind the oil companies’ 
investment in solar cell manufacturing, which is one of the most capital-intensive 
renewable energy technologies: 
“[The oil companies’ rationale for investing in solar energy may be that]   
they also view it as a good early hedge on being able to [...] quickly turn  
more resources on to something that gives them a carbon hedge or reduce 
carbon-risk-exposure.” 
When we look at technology risk beyond investing in a specific company, but more 
broadly on a sector level, a question raises about whether there is a sufficient technology 
base in the energy sector to lead to good VC deals in the first place. One way of 
measuring this is to look at government R&D spendings in the energy sector. Margolis 
and Kammen (1999) argue that there is underinvestment in energy R&D in the USA. 
Calculating R&D intensity, defined as total (public and private) industrial energy R&D as 
a proportion of the country’s total energy expenditures, they show that the energy   
sector with just 0.5% of sales going to R&D lags far behind sectors like drugs and 
medicine or communications equipment, who have a R&D intensity in the order of 10%. 
Then again, as Sagar and Holdren (2002) argue, measuring R&D spendings is 
complicated by the interdisciplinary nature of many energy innovations, so what should 
count as energy-relevant research is often unclear. In conclusion, there seems to be 
preliminary evidence that energy suffers from a lack of R&D that could be an important 
input to the energy venture capital sector.
12 
2.3 People  risk 
The success of VC investments crucially depends on the ability of entrepreneurs   
and venture managers to grow the company, or to ‘execute’ to use a term from typical 
VC jargon. This can be judged in advance only to a limited extent. High-growth 
companies constantly change, and that means constant changes in the challenges   
that their management faces. Apart from careful selection of the investment target and 
due diligence on the management team,
13 this risk is typically managed by close 
monitoring of the investment, coaching the team as the company grows, and sometimes 
by replacing the existing management. Are there enough creative inventors and 
courageous entrepreneurs in energy, compared to other sectors? We are faced with 
different views here. A North American VC seemed not to see a lack of entrepreneurship 
in energy: 
“I don’t think that the entrepreneurial instinct or interest drops off a cliff [...] 
when [...] you get to energy. There are entrepreneurs trying to find 
opportunities everywhere. [...] They are all driven by greed or wealth   
creation. But also have these characteristics of being [...] creative-driven and 
obsessed, good team builders and I don’t think that’s asymmetric in a sense to 
the energy sector.” 
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On the other hand, respondents of our survey, when asked about the importance of ‘better 
engineers for energy ventures’ versus ‘better management teams for energy ventures’ as 
possible fostering factors for energy VC in Europe, ranked the issue of better 
management as the fourth important of 13 items, while better engineers was the least 
important factor in their view. One possible explanation is that there is a US-European 
difference here; with Europe having (more than) enough good engineers but not enough 
business people capable of managing growth for energy ventures. Since successful 
venture managers need not just creativity and entrepreneurial spirit but also some solid 
industry expertise, where can they be recruited from? One option is from large companies 
in the same industry, which is a pattern that can be found in other VC sectors. For energy, 
this might mean some conflict with the lack of innovativeness in the utility industry 
discussed above: 
“You could find some good people there [in the utility industry]. Provided that 
they have the right mindset. [...] It’s tough. If you stayed there for 25 years, you 
might be very good, but you’re a military and you’re not an entrepreneur. They 
could come from equipment manufacturers. I think the single most important 
source is equipment manufacturers. [...] But we don’t see too many people like 
that. Because it’s by definition risky to do that. Only a small proportion of 
people want to leave their job in GE or ABB and go to a smaller company.” 
A particular issue in our interviews evolves around the green image that might be 
associated with sustainable and especially renewable energy technologies. We tried to 
find out whether VCs perceive this to be reflected in the mindset of entrepreneurs in this 
sector, and if yes, whether that might lead to a cultural mismatch between these ‘green’ 
entrepreneurs and the primarily financially driven venture capitalists. We found some 
support for this proposition, most pronounced in the following statement by a VC of 
Italian nationality:  
“Enough people in the renewables space, their primary motivation is to save the 
world, create jobs, equal opportunities, and interestingly enough, many times 
making a lot of money is almost unethical, you know. And obviously VCs, they 
shy away from that.” (…) “Environmentally oriented people, they see the end 
of the world coming.” 
However, asking the question whether this ‘save-the-world’ image of sustainability 
entrepreneurs is a major barrier to entry for VCs, we received very mixed responses in 
our survey, ranging from very strong support to very strong rejection. One way to explain 
this large variance of answers might be that a major change is going on in the way that 
sustainable energy is perceived – from an almost esoteric green niche to an established 
mainstream business: 
“Back in 1992 at the time of the [...] Rio Summit, renewables was still an issue 
of kind of benevolent action, you know, it didn’t make economic sense but it 
was the right thing to do. I think that’s increasingly changing. [...] I think it 
will, you know ultimately the market has to recognise it’s a place where people 
are making money and they’ll take it seriously. I think with a lot of literacy 
they saw the industry at some point as a place where people weren‘t making 
money for years and years. [...] [Now] solar is getting to a scale were big 
investors are starting to pay more and more attention. Same thing with wind.  
It is, I think, very telling that GE got into that business and then Enron   
was there too.”     
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
       Do venture capitalists really invest in good industries?  73     
 
 
      
 
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
           
 
2.4 Regulatory  risk 
The main source of regulatory risk, or political risk, is government regulation of the  
end market(s) that the venture aims to serve. Political risk scored high among the   
energy VCs participating in our survey, being the second often-mentioned factor when 
we asked the 26 respondents an open question about reasons for the lower levels of VC 
investments in energy compared to other sectors. There was a perception that it is 
difficult to predict future government subsidies in the energy sector, and that market 
liberalisation of the electricity sector has somewhat stalled in several countries, making  
it challenging for new entrants to compete with the former monopolists. Regulatory risk 
is usually disliked by investors because it seems harder to manage or even outside their 
area of influence. However, other VC target sectors such as telecom or biotechnology are 
also highly regulated. VCs in the biotech industry, however, may manage this risk by 
supporting early-stage R&D but then exiting their investments prior to achieving 
regulatory hurdles like FDA approval for new drugs. Regulatory risk can also be 
managed by careful analysis of the political system, or even actively lobbying for 
particular forms of regulation. Looking at our interview data, many VCs seemed to share 
a not-so-enthusiastic picture of governments: “If there is no clear need for the 
government, make them stay out of the way”. 
On the other hand, one of the interviewees pointed to another truth below the surface,  
i.e., below the immediate reflex of VCs against government intervention: 
“On a superficial level, VCs will always say that they go out because   
it [government involvement] is bad for them. You have to push your research  
a level deeper, because for instance the reason why Quebec has got a   
VC industry in life sciences and in IT is because initially there was some 
heavy-handed governmental intervention. We think it’s something like that in 
the field of energy.” 
Another VC pointed to lobbying as a form of regulatory risk management: “VCs need to 
have competence in lobbying if they want to succeed in the energy sector, just like the 
big American mainstream VCs have their guys in Washington DC”. 
Finally, a German VC argued that government support for renewable energy in 
particular can be seen not only as a risk, but also as an opportunity: “We actually think 
we have a unique opportunity here in Germany with all that government support for 
renewables. That was one of the reasons for us to invest in a solar cell company”. 
Government support for VC investments in sustainable energy can take different 
forms, including policy measures directed at market adoption of sustainable energy 
technologies (such as energy market liberalisation, removal of coal subsidies, removal of 
export credit insurance for fossil-based power plants, energy-efficiency standards in the 
automotive sector, and an EU carbon tax) as well as measures to support VC investment 
specifically (such as tax incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy 
investment, or state guarantees for realised losses in young energy technology 
companies) (Kasemir et al., 2000). Governments can also directly contribute to the 
growth of the sustainable energy VC market by investing their own funds. Examples of 
this include the recent announcement by the largest public pension fund in California, 
CalPERS, to invest $200 million in sustainability or cleantech ventures, as well as 
government VC funds like Industrifonden in Sweden, which invests part of its capital in 
sustainable energy ventures. Lerner (1999), in his analysis of the US SBIR programme as     
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a government-backed venture capital activity, identifies two rationales for this kind of 
government intervention in the venture capital sector. First, the social returns from the 
ventures’ R&D expenditures may exceed their private returns – which should be all the 
more valid in the case of sustainable energy technologies that help to remove the 
environmental externalities associated with conventional forms of power generation. 
Second, awarding public grants might be seen as a form of certification of the firm’s 
quality by knowledgeable government officials, which might address the informational 
asymmetries that might otherwise have precluded private investments. 
2.5 Exit  risk 
The opportunity to exit investments after some years is a key part of the VC cycle, 
because it allows VC investors to get a quantitative measure for the VC fund manager’s 
skill, and it allows the VC to reapply his competencies to a specific part in the life cycle 
of a company’s development where he adds most value (Black and Gilson, 1998). Exits 
can take five forms (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Gladstone, 1989), of which the first 
two are most relevant: 
1  public offering of the company’s shares (IPO) 
2  trade sale (or acquisition), where a larger company acquires the shares of the venture 
3  secondary sale, where the VC sells its share in the company to a third party like a 
strategic investor or another VC 
4  buyout, where the VC sells its share to the entrepreneurial firm or its management, 
and finally, but less desirable 
5  write-off in case of the venture’s failure. 
As Wright and Robbie (1998) point out, most previous research has focussed on IPOs as 
the exit route (Lange et al., 2001),
14 while the trade-off between acquisitions and IPOs 
seems to have been largely overlooked by academic research (Hellmann, 2004). Yet Amit 
et al. (1998) show for a sample of Canadian VC-backed companies that trade sales are 
more than twice as common as IPOs. Their explanation is that due to informational 
asymmetries, strategic acquirers (or the firm’s management in the case of a buyout) are in 
a better position to understand the value of a high-tech venture than an average outside 
investor. Megginson (2004) points out that exit routes strongly differ between the USA 
and Europe, with IPOs being the preferred exit route in the USA, but accounting for only 
5% in Europe in 2002, while trade sales and write-offs accounted for 30% each. One 
explanation for these differences is that most countries outside the USA lack a similarly 
well-established stock market for early-stage high technology companies (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Kuemmerle, 2001). The relative importance of exit routes also changes 
over time. During the technology boom in the late 1990s, IPOs were much more likely to 
occur than in the 2002–2004 time period, when the IPO window was essentially closed  
in many countries. Among the few authors investigating trade sales as an exit route, Petty 
et al. (1994) point to the fact that trade sales provide more immediate liquidity, but may 
not satisfy the objectives of the entrepreneur. Black and Gilson (1998) stress that same 
point when they argue that exit through IPO provides a unique match of the interests of 
both the entrepreneur to reacquire control over the company and the VC to reduce his 
monitoring cost.      
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In stark contrast to the focus on exit through IPO in the (mostly North American) 
venture capital literature, our survey of energy VCs showed that exit through trade sale is 
expected to be much more frequent in this sector in Europe. On average, the VCs in our 
sample expected 80% of their current portfolio companies to exit through trade sale, and 
just 20% through IPO. In terms of possible trade sale buyers for VC-backed energy 
technology companies, electric utilities seem to be a natural option, given that many 
European utilities are active in this space with their own Corporate Venture Capital units. 
However, the electric utility industry does not enjoy a reputation of being overly 
innovative among the VCs we interviewed: 
“In energy, you make money in two ways, either by selling raw services   
– generation, transmission or distribution – or by arbitraging the price 
difference between two regions, that’s basically trading. So new technologies 
or innovation don’t play a role as a way to engage in continuous growth. So 
therefore it is in fact tougher to sell to energy companies because they don’t 
have the mindset.” – “Pharma companies [...] have to innovate to survive. In 
three years, 60% of what you are selling now will be down to 20–25% on sales. 
[...] If you don’t innovate, if you don’t find something new, you’re dead. It’s 
simple as that.” 
Utilities’ risk aversion was quoted as another factor that makes them unlikely candidates 
for VC exits in the energy technology sector: 
“Utilities have a tendency to really only want to work with more mature 
companies and not with companies that they are concerned would disappear. 
Whereas you see in companies like, you know, Cisco or maybe even in the 
Biotech area partnerships between, you know, small lab companies and these 
big pharmaceutical companies. Utilities don’t seem to approach it that way.”  
Another respondent confirmed that pharma companies have a better understanding of 
investing in small ventures: “[Big pharma companies act] like a VC, (...) they have a 
portfolio approach”. 
Yet another interviewee points out that utilities may not be the only, and in fact 
perhaps not the most likely trade sale buyers in the energy venture capital sector. Instead, 
power technology manufacturers constitute an alternative route to market: 
“They [power technology manufacturers like GE, ABB] are the ones that 
ultimately are much more focused on innovation because they know how to 
absorb it and turn it into a value proposition. There’s very little that an 
electricity company can innovate on, because [...] they are just in the core 
business of selling, you know, electrons. And there’s no big changes that have 
happened [...] since the beginning of last the century that has really changed the 
way that wholesale power has been delivered to costumers.”  
This view was confirmed by a majority of participants in our survey, who saw power 
technology manufacturers such as GE, Siemens, and ABB as the most likely trade sale 
buyers for energy technology ventures, clearly more important than electric utilities and 
oil companies. Whether the expectations of the VCs vis-à-vis power technology 
manufacturers will be met in reality remains to be seen. At the time of our survey, GE 
was the only one of these companies that had made a handful of significant acquisitions 
in the sustainable energy sector, buying the wind turbine manufacturing business from 
Enron, the Austrian biogas and CHP specialist Jenbacher, and the assets of Astropower, 
the US solar cell manufacturer. Notably, none of these three deals was a case of 
successful exit for a VC. Both Enron and Astropower had gone bankrupt at the time that 
GE made the acquisitions, and Jenbacher was a publicly traded company. Siemens has     
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entered the sustainable energy sector two years later than GE with the acquisition of 
Bonus, the privately held Danish wind turbine manufacturer, in late 2004. One of the few 
examples of a successful trade sale for a European energy VC so far was FKI’s 
acquisition of DeWind, the German wind turbine manufacturer, from MVV’s corporate 
venture capital fund. Understanding the likelihood of these companies to actually acquire 
VC-backed energy technology start-ups in the future will be an important determinator of 
the sector’s ability to attract venture capital.  
Finally, going back to our research question about the relevance of each of the risks 
we discussed in this section for the future growth of VC investments in the energy sector, 
exits have an important function in that they draw other investors’ attention to the 
opportunities in energy venture capital. With that regard, the energy VCs we interviewed 
appeared to be fairly sceptical about the sector that they invested in: “There aren’t that 
many success stories, [and] the few success stories that there were three years ago […] 
created a huge bubble in the energy sector”. 
The perception of ‘few success stories’ expressed here is shared by participants in our 
survey. Of the 26 responding European energy VCs, only nine could answer our question 
about the most successful exit for an energy VC in the past decade. A total of seven 
different companies were named, one of which was not an energy company. In another 
case, there actually was no exit because the planned IPO of the company had failed, and 
yet another case described a company without VC-backing. Of the remaining four truly 
successful energy VC exits named by our survey respondents, three companies were 
located in North America (Plug Power, Capstone and Ballard) and can justifiably be 
attributed to the energy technology bubble in 1999 and 2000. The only European 
company that was mentioned was Vestas Wind Systems of Denmark. It comes as no 
surprise then that ‘success stories of VCs exiting energy investments’ was the top scorer 
in our survey when we asked respondents to judge the importance of each of 13 fostering 
factors that could accelerate growth of sustainable energy VC investments over the next 
five years. This leads us to take a closer look at the other side of the risk-return equation 
in the following chapter. 
3 Return 
From a venture capitalist’s perspective, a return on investment is realised at the time of 
exit. We will briefly discuss the variables determining VC returns (Section 3.1) with 
regards to the relative attractiveness of sustainable energy as a target for VC investments, 
as well as barriers and fostering factors for further growth. Subsequently, we take a look 
at actual VC returns in the energy sector (Section 3.2).  
3.1  Factors influencing energy VC returns 
On the level of an individual portfolio investment, VC returns are basically a product of 
three variables: 
1  the price the VC paid at the time of investing 
2  the sales price at the time of exiting the investment by selling shares on the public 
market or to a trade sale buyer 
3  the time between one and two, i.e., between investment and exit.     
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Obviously, the best return will be achieved by buying low, selling high, and doing   
so quickly. 
The first part of the equation, the purchasing price for energy VC investors, depends 
on a number of factors, including supply and demand for energy VC deals, and   
the reputation of the VC (Black and Gilson, 1998). All things being equal, more supply 
(i.e., entrepreneurial firms seeking funding) should lead to lower prices, because VCs  
can choose from a larger variety of investment opportunities, and increasing demand  
(i.e., VCs looking for investment opportunities) should lead to higher prices (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2000). Anecdotal evidence from the energy technology industry does not 
seem to support any substantial supply-demand imbalances compared to other VC 
sectors. On the supply side, specialist energy VCs report a ratio of deal flow to actual 
investments in the order of magnitude of 100:1, which is comparable to standard VC 
ratios. On the demand side, recent articles from industry journals indicate increasing 
excitement among some of the mainstream VCs about opportunities in the energy sector, 
which should lead to better prices for the entrepreneurial ventures, hence somewhat 
diminishing the prospects for good VC returns. However, this seems to be far from a 
hype that would see many VCs compete for energy deals and driving up prices. 
Anecdotal European evidence suggests that, even in cases where deals have reached 
substantial publicity, the number of knowledgeable VCs truly interested in investing 
seems to match with, but not greatly exceed the financing needs of the venture. The 
reputation of the VC might have an effect on its negotiating power, hence resulting in a 
cheaper price for the investment. Some specialist VCs in the energy sector have indeed 
managed to build up a good reputation for their industry expertise, but this should not 
have an impact on the sector as a whole, but rather give those VCs a competitive 
advantage over some of their peers, just as other sectors have seen a tier of top-quartile 
VC funds persistently outperform their peers (Kaplan and Schoar, 2004). 
The second part of the equation, the price at exit, looks differently at the exit routes 
discussed above. For IPOs, the VC’s return depends to some extent on the IPO price, but 
venture capitalists, as well as other insiders such as the entrepreneur, usually have to 
agree to a 180-day post-IPO lock-up period during which they are not allowed to sell 
their shares. Even then, VC investors cannot immediately sell all of their shares without 
having a serious impact on the company’s share price performance. This is particularly 
true for early-stage technology companies, where the liquidity of the stock may be low. 
Therefore, divestment typically occurs in multiple stages, and total holding periods can 
be as long as 1–3 years after the IPO.
15 Obviously, share price performance post-IPO 
depends on various factors, including company news but also overall market trends that 
cannot be managed by the VC. The typical fluctuations in stock markets also mean that 
returns that can be realised through this exit route will be highly cyclical in nature,   
with VCs making better returns when the particular sector is in favour of the market, and 
vice versa.  
In the case of exit through trade sale, the price and therefore the return to the VC 
depend not only on the fundamental value of the venture, but also on its strategic value to 
the acquirer. For example, a gas turbine manufacturer may be prepared to pay a premium 
for acquiring a fuel cell venture if he sees this as a potential threat to its incumbent 
business. As a tendency, more competition on the level of potential acquirers should 
drive this premium up, while it should be lower in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. 
Looking at the energy sector, the European market has oligopolistic characteristics both     
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on the level of electric utilities, as potential users of sustainable energy technologies, as 
well as on the level of power technology manufacturers. This might negatively impact the 
price that can be achieved in trade sales. Further research can test this empirically by 
comparing trade sale performance of VC deals across different sectors, combined with an 
analysis of the level of market concentration among the trade sale buyers in these sectors. 
The third and final part of the VC return equation, the time between investment and 
exit, is important because even if VCs neither pay higher prices for investing in energy 
deals, nor achieve less favourable terms when exiting their investment, the annualised 
return may still be worse than in other sectors when the investment cycle is significantly 
longer. This leads back to the issues of capital intensity and long technology lead times 
discussed in the section on technology risk above (Section 2.2), and will therefore not be 
discussed in further detail here. An empirical investigation of average holding periods for 
energy VC investments compared to biotech or ICT investments would shed more light 
on this issue, but will be challenging to do at this point given the short history of energy 
VC investments in Europe.  
3.2  Early empirical evidence on past energy VC returns 
A simple and common form for investors to estimate expected returns from venture 
capital investment in a certain sector is to look at IPO performance of previous   
venture-backed firms. In the energy technology sector, this provides a not too promising 
picture at first sight. Figure 2 gives four examples of US-based, VC-backed energy 
technology companies: Evergreen Solar, a solar cell manufacturer, Beacon Power and 
Active Power, both developers of energy storage technology (flywheels), and Plug 
Power, a fuel cell company. All of these were backed by some of the most prominent US 
energy venture capital firms prior to their Initial Public Offerings (IPO) in 1999 and 2000 
and traded between 63 and 95% below their IPO price on 3 September 2004. 
Figure 2  Post-IPO price performance of VC-backed energy technology companies versus 
NASDAQ index 
Source:   Own calculation based on share price data (Bloomberg; normalised to 
IPO price = 100) 
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Then again, looking at the stock price performance post-IPO does not tell the full story. 
VCs typically invest well before the IPO event, and at lower prices than the IPO price. 
Also, they are usually free to divest the stock after the lock-up period expired, so even if 
the long-term performance of these shares looks less than promising, a VC investor who 
divests at the right time may realise a decent return. Measuring actual energy VC returns 
is complicated by the fact that the exact timing of the divestment is not publicly available 
information. To get a clearer picture of at least the theoretical returns that a VC investor 
could have realised had he sold his shares at the first day after the end of the lock-up 
period, we calculated the annualised Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
16 for VC investors in 
the four companies mentioned above. We gathered data about the purchasing price that 
investors paid for the company’s shares in various pre-IPO financing rounds from the 
companies’ IPO prospectuses. On the other side of the equation, we determined the share 
price at 180 days after the IPO, the end of the lock-up period for VC investors.
17 We then 
annualised these returns by taking into account the time between the various financing 
rounds and the end of the lock-up period. The results for the four energy technology 
companies are shown in Figure 3, providing quite a different picture: The lowest IRR in 
the 15 financing rounds that we looked at was 49% p.a. for investors in Evergreen Solar’s 
early stage (Series B) financing, which is still well in the range of typical VC return 
requirements of 30%–50% p.a. All other rounds exceeded this, with investors in Plug 
Power’s pre-IPO (Series E) financing round making a comfortable 5231% IRR. We have 
to acknowledge that the Plug Power case may be exceptional because the end of the  
lock-up period in late April 2000 coincided with the peak of the technology bubble and 
also benefited from a fuel cell hype at the time. Another indicator for the influence of the 
bubble is that returns for these four companies increase over the subsequent financing 
rounds of each company. One would expect exactly the opposite: early-stage investors 
usually have higher hurdle rates due to the higher risk they incur, while IRR should 
decrease for later stage financing rounds.  
Figure 3  Theoretical VC returns for selected energy technology companies 
Source:  Own calculation based on VC investment data from IPO prospectuses 
and share price data (Bloomberg) 
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We acknowledge some limitations of this analysis. First, the sample of just four 
companies that we looked at here for reasons of convenient data availability needs to be 
expanded in a broader analysis, particularly with regard to non-US companies. Second, 
any analysis of VC returns that looks at successful IPOs is inherently subject to a 
survivorship bias, even if this is to some extent already considered in the VCs’ return 
requirements that account for the risk of failure in some of their portfolio companies. 
Third, trade sales need to be added to get a full picture of exiting energy VC investments, 
even if data is harder to find than in the case of IPOs. Ultimately, energy VC returns will 
be more accurately measured by looking at overall fund returns (Kaplan and Schoar, 
2004; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jones and Rhodes-Kropf, 2003; Ljungqvist and 
Richardson, 2002). This, however, can only accurately be done after a fund has been 
liquidated. Therefore, such an analysis is subject to a time lag of about a decade after 
energy technology VC funds are first set up, which makes it difficult to apply to the 
emerging European energy VC sector before the 2010 timeframe.  
Nevertheless, we can conclude that there is at least anecdotal evidence for attractive 
returns by venture capitalists in the energy sector.
18 Our exploratory analysis shows that a 
common perception – even among the energy VCs that we interviewed – of energy as a 
conservative sector where high-tech investors are unable to make money needs to be 
revisited, at least for the period in 2000 and 2001 where public financial markets 
provided a favourable environment for energy technology stocks. This means that 
rational risk-return considerations can apparently only explain part of the story when we 
ask for reasons that determine the lower level of VC investments in energy compared to 
some of the other industries. In Section 4 below, we therefore turn to factors that are 
beyond the immediate rationality of risk and return. 
4  The time factor: path dependencies in VC investing 
The previous sections have highlighted some of the differences in perceived risk and 
expected return that can help explain how venture capitalists consider the attractiveness 
of sustainable energy technologies compared to other sectors. However, there is not 
sufficient evidence to support the order-of-magnitude difference observed in VC 
investment levels, and hence answer our research question. Instead, there is an underlying 
theme both in our interview data as well as in VC literature that can be more clearly 
understood in an evolutionary perspective: The time it takes for the venture capital 
market to adapt to changing opportunities, and the inherent path dependencies.
19 A 
process is path dependent if what has happened in the past has an impact on the choices 
that are available in the present. Path dependencies in venture capital can be identified on 
the supply and the demand-side of the market. 
In terms of venture capital supply, Gompers and Lerner (1999) point out that, unlike 
most financial markets, the VC industry adjusts very slowly to shifts in the supply of 
capital or the demand for financing. They argue that this is due to the nature of   
the companies that they invest in, which usually require long-run illiquid investments. 
VCs need to secure funds from their investors for periods of a decade or more, and 
consequently the supply of venture capital cannot adjust as quickly as for example mutual 
or hedge funds. Another factor that is difficult to adjust according to Gompers and Lerner 
is the supply of venture capitalists, since it is difficult and time-consuming to acquire the 
skills needed for successful VC investing. Also, raising new funds without a track record     
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is a challenging task, which inherently slows down adjustment of VC investment levels to 
changes in investment opportunities. Black and Gilson (1998), in their attempt to explain 
differences in the development of VC markets between the USA and other countries, 
concur that experienced VCs as well as investment bankers experienced in taking   
early-stage companies public are critical institutions that will not develop quickly. They 
conclude that a ‘strong venture capital market thus reflects an equilibrium of a number of 
interdependent factors, only one of which is the presence of a stock market’. 
Some of these ‘interdependent factors’ are aspects of path dependencies on the 
demand side of the venture capital market. Kuemmerle (2001; Black and Gilson, 1998), 
in his comparison of the evolution of VC industries in the USA, Germany and Japan, 
points out that “an active venture capital industry is argueably more difficult to create 
than an active buy-out industry because the former typically requires not just a 
functioning financial system, but also a fertile technology system and a climate 
conducive to entrepreneurship”. As much as these authors addressed issues that were 
important for answering our research question, it should be noted that the statements 
quoted here are usually qualitative side notes in the VC literature, but have hardly been 
put to the forefront of rigorous academic analysis. Questions about the process of 
adjusting demand and supply in the VC market and changing sector allocation seem to be 
a gap in previous research. Addressing this gap in future research is important in order to 
understand how new market sectors for VC investment emerge.  
We can provide some early evidence from our interviews about the points raised here. 
One example of path dependencies on the supply side that we encountered is the fact that 
VCs tend to invest in areas where they feel competent, and this in turn is a function of 
their previous experience – in other words: money flows where money knows. As one of 
our interviewees, partner of a VC fund with focus on IT and biotech, has put it:  
“I think [...] there is one reason [for the low level of energy VC investment] 
which has to do with the capabilities of people and funds. People tend to invest 
in technologies that they know, where they know people they can talk to, where 
they can check the technology is good, is different compared to where the 
market is, to other things on the market. And most of the funds have people that 
come either from three sectors, IT, telecom, or life sciences.” – “Look at [my 
colleague] here, coming from a very successful IT company, founded by 
probably Canada’s four most successful entrepreneurs. You know, he has a 
network, has people he can call and check. He knows people telling him 
something about wireless, people he can talk to. And I can call people in 
biotech, and suddenly have an answer. Many funds don’t have those networks 
[in energy], so when they hit an energy deal they don’t want to do it because 
you have so much work to do when you have a deal and it’s difficult to find the 
expertise, and they just put it away and never answer to it. And it just dies 
because people don’t get it and that’s probably certainly one key reason – the 
lack of people in funds who have a network in the energy sector.” 
Then again, the conventional wisdom of VCs is that they are not just routinely doing 
what they have always done, but that they are if not geniuses, than at least visionaries to 
some extent and as such by definition immune against path dependencies. According to 
one of our interviewees, however, this picture may be the exception rather than the rule in 
the energy sector: 
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“The other [issue] is, are VCs competent enough to see, to think in a contrarian 
fashion and see the opportunities that aren’t obvious in the market today? 
Because that’s ultimately where VCs, where the really good venture capitalists 
make their money, because they are investing their time where nobody sees it 
coming. And that may be just an issue of there aren’t enough practitioners in 
the energy area. How many, you know, really creative revolutionary thinkers 
are out there investing in energy and really see where this industry is 
transforming and changing. There aren’t that many and there aren’t that many 
that have funds behind them. Right!?”  
As a conclusion, growing the energy VC market would mean that the amount of 
visionaries in the energy VC community needs to increase, which might be a challenging 
or time-intensive endeavour. As one interviewee puts it, alluding to the inevitable   
trial-and-error process that marks the way towards making competent investment 
decisions in a new sector: “It takes ten million dollars to educate a VC”. 
Perhaps somewhat typical of an evolutionary perspective, the question remains 
whether anything can be done about these issues, or whether the result of the analysis is 
simply to increase the reader’s patience, because we know now that these things need 
time to be resolved, but are ultimately going to happen.
20 Taking the apparent lack of 
visionaries as an example: Can government or any other invisible hand direct more 
visionaries to the energy VC sector? Maybe not. A more realistic view seems to lead us 
back to our risk/return considerations: demonstrating that there are opportunities to make 
good returns, and understanding how to manage the risks will probably be a particularly 
promising way to increase energy VC investment levels. Also, further research that 
improves our understanding of drivers behind the shifts in VC supply and demand might 
help to bring the process closer to a speed that would be desirable from a societal point of 
view, or simply rational from a pure risk/return perspective. Such research can address 
three levels: 
1  supply of capital 
2  supply of venture capital professionals 
3  demand for venture capital. 
On the capital supply side, research should be directed at investors in VC funds (pension 
funds, financial investors, and strategic investors), aiming at understanding how they 
perceive opportunities in the energy sector and how this translates into their sector 
allocation within the VC asset class. On the VC level, tracking the background of energy 
VC professionals might be a first step to improve our understanding of where the 
required competence for VC investments in energy has come from so far, and where 
more of it may come from in the future. Finally, on the demand side, research should 
compare the energy innovation system with the innovation system in biotechnology and 
IT, for example taking Kuemmerle’s (2001; Black and Gilson, 1998) question of whether 
there is a climate conducive to entrepreneurship from a country level to an industry level. 
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5 Concluding  remarks 
We started this paper by asking the question “Do venture capitalists really invest in good 
industries?” We addressed this question by looking at the risk-return characteristics of 
VC investment opportunities in the energy sector to see whether energy lacked some of 
the ‘good industry’ characteristics that would attract more venture capital. Based on our 
analysis, the answer is: “yes, to some extent”. In fact, discussing the risk and return of 
VC investing in sustainable energy technologies compared to other sectors, we have 
identified a number of relevant sector-specific risks (see summary in Table 1). In terms of 
market adoption risk, the conservatism of the electric utility industry is perceived as 
slowing down adoption of innovative technologies. Another factor is the partly societal 
nature of the benefits created by sustainable technologies. Technology risk is high 
compared to typical information technology deals (due to capital intensity and long 
technology lead times), but not fundamentally different from many biotechnology deals. 
People risk seems to be an issue with regard to a perceived (yet not undisputed) lack of 
qualified energy management teams (rather than engineers), especially in Europe. Unlike 
some of the more developed sectors for VC investing, there are few serial entrepreneurs 
in energy so far. Also, some VCs perceive the ‘green’ image of sustainable energy and 
entrepreneurs in this sector as increasing people risk. Regulatory risk seems to be 
particularly relevant in the energy sector, and few VCs seem to believe that the regulatory 
opportunities created by climate and renewable energy policies compensate for that. 
Finally, exit risk is an important factor. The number of success stories in terms of energy 
IPOs is limited so far. As for trade sales as the expected dominant exit route, the 
industry’s most visible companies, electric utilities, are not perceived as likely candidates 
for acquiring VC-backed entrepreneurial energy firms. Instead, they are portrayed as 
being more conservative than their counterparts in pharma/biotech or IT.  
Table 1  Sector-specific risks for energy VC investments and ways of managing them 
Category of risk  Perceived problem Potential  solution 
Product market risk  Conservative utilities as customers 
Societal vs. private benefits 
Addressing more than one  
market segment 
Identify clear customer value 
Technology risk  Long lead times 
Capital intensity 
Infrastructure 
Appropriate business model 
People risk  Few serial entrepreneurs 
Good engineers, poor managers? 
‘Green’ image 
Time 
Market liberalisation increases 
human mobility 
Regulatory risk  Energy policy framework seems 
unpredictable 
Increase understanding 
Lobbying 
Diversification 
Exit risk  Few success stories (IPOs) 
Utilities unlikely candidates for 
trade sales 
AIM 
Power technology manufacturers as 
potential trade sale buyers     
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
     84  R. Wüstenhagen and T. Teppo      
 
      
 
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
           
 
Yet, we do not find unlimited support for the hypothesis that energy is a ‘bad industry’ 
for venture capitalists, and hence that VC investment allocation across industries would 
follow a fully rational pattern. In discussing the risks identified, we pointed to ways of 
managing each of them. Product market risk and technology risk can basically be 
addressed by appropriate business models, putting an emphasis on clear customer value 
and efficient use of capital. People risk seems to be largely a matter of time, where in a 
more mature market, more experienced entrepreneurs will develop. The opportunities 
created by market liberalisation may also increase the availability of good managers for 
innovative energy ventures. In terms of regulatory risk, some of the VCs’ perceptions 
seem to be based on the lack of understanding of the energy policy framework. 
Furthermore, incumbent industries have developed ways of managing regulatory risk, 
such as lobbying or geographical diversification. Successful VCs may adopt some of 
these practises. Finally, our analysis of exits showed that there is at least anecdotal 
evidence for success stories, despite the fact that few of the VCs in our sample were able 
to name successful previous exits in the sector. Also, the recent series of energy 
technology IPOs at London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
which included several international companies, illustrates some of the less obvious exit 
opportunities. As for trade sales, our analysis clearly showed that power technology 
manufacturers rather than utilities are likely candidates for trade sales. 
In conclusion, both on the risk and on the return sides of the equation, the gradual 
differences between energy and the other VC sectors alone seem to be insufficient to 
fully explain the difference observed in VC investment levels, and a more comprehensive 
answer will have to take an evolutionary perspective. This will not help to find a 
definitive answer to the question whether VCs invest in good industries, but instead will 
shed light on a slightly different question, which is: “Why does it take so long for VCs to 
invest in newly emerging ‘good’ industries, and what can be done about it?” Overcoming 
inherent path dependencies will be an important challenge for entrepreneurs, financiers 
and policy makers who have an interest in seeing the market for sustainable energy VC 
grow. At the same time, those who are successful at it more quickly than others are likely 
to benefit greatly from the fundamental changes in the energy sector. 
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Notes 
1  The term Private Equity is also sometimes used as a generic term including all stages of 
private financing from early-stage venture capital to late-stage pre-IPO investments. In this 
paper, however, we only look at venture capital and use the term Private Equity to describe 
late stage and buyout investments. 
2 http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iea2002/table63.xls 
3 http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iea2001/table18.xls 
4  See for example SAM (2002) or Wüstenhagen (2000) for a more extensive discussion of 
sustainable energy technologies. 
5  See for example a recent cover story of the US Venture Capital Journal (Henig, 2003). 
6  See Sagar and Holdren (2002) for a similar argument about the difficulties in counting   
energy-relevant R&D expenditures. 
7 http://www.europeanenergyfair.com 
8  See for example Zacharakis and Meyer (1998,p.61) for an overview. 
9 www.energetech.com.au 
10 www.capstoneturbine.com 
11 www.enginion.com 
12  To fully assess the correlation between low levels of R&D spending and venture capital 
investment in the energy sector, one would have to take other elements of the energy 
innovation system into account, such as technology transfer mechanisms, public and private 
funding for demonstration projects, university spin-offs, etc. – Cf. the analysis of Müller et al. 
(2004) on ‘Sources of bioentrepreneruship’ or Venkataraman’s (2004) discussion of the 
‘Seven intangibles of regional technological entrepreneurship’. 
13  A particularly innovative proposal for managing people risk in the selection phase comes from 
one of the VCs interviewed by Fried and Hisrich (1994) proposing to visit the entrepreneur at 
home: “I like to go out and meet the spouse and the kids and try to see if their home is in chaos 
or if it’s pretty orderly”. 
14  See for example Barry et al. (Wright and Robbie, 1998), Gompers and Lerner (BVK, 2003) 
and Lange et al. (2001). 
15  In a sample of 433 VC-backed IPOs in the 1978–1987 time period, Barry et al. (1990) found 
that VCs had only reduced their shareholdings by an average 28% one year after the IPO. 
16  See Kaplan and Schoar (2004) for an extensive discussion about IRR and alternative 
performance measures for venture capital funds. 
17  We acknowledge that by assuming an exit at IPO plus 180 days, and given the negative share 
price development for these companies since then, we probably overestimate actual returns  
to a certain extent. Also, transaction cost for liquidating the investment is not included in  
our analysis. 
18  This is confirmed by the results of two recent analyses with larger samples. Logerfo (2005) 
looked at 800 exits of cleantech ventures, including energy technology, and demonstrated 
favourable returns both for trade sales and IPOs. Moore (2005) investigated a sample of 88 
energy technology IPOs in the 1996–2004 period and came to similar conclusions. 
19  See the following references for a discussion of the concept of path dependencies in various 
disciplines of the social sciences: Pierson (2000), North (1990) and Goldstone (1998). 
20  This seems to be the conclusion from population ecology approaches to explaining growth of 
the VC market in several European countries, see for example Manigart (1994). 